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ALEXANDER’S GENIUS 
Mitchell N. Berman 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Larry Alexander has more views on more diverse topics—and certainly more views that are 
carefully formulated and defended—than probably any other Anglophone legal theorist writing today.  
In several books and over two hundred articles, essays, and book chapters, written alone or with one or 
another co-author from a large and impressive stable, Alexander has forcefully advanced more 
heterodox theses than I can count, and far more than I could possibly list in this space.   
Still, for those who lack deep familiarity with Alexander’s oeuvre, it behooves me to convey at 
least a flavor of his breadth and originality.  Here, then, is a sampling of some of the striking theses he 
has defended across diverse areas of legal theory from jurisprudence and legal reasoning to 
constitutional theory to moral philosophy and the philosophy of criminal law.  Alexander has maintained 
that, as far as judgments of blame and responsibility are concerned, there is no qualitative difference 
between intending harm and risking it: moral blameworthiness is always a function of an actor’s 
perception of risk and the reasons that explain or motivate her action.  Punishment for incomplete 
attempts is unjust: criminal responsibility for attempts does not properly lie at any stage short of the last 
act that “unleashes” a risk of injury to a legally protected interest.  Punishment for criminal negligence is 
also unjust, for persons are never blameworthy for courting risks inadvertently.  There are no such 
things as legal principles.  Nor is there a human right to freedom of expression.  The purpose of law is 
always and only to resolve what, morally speaking, ought to be done.  The proper object of 
constitutional interpretation is always and necessarily to ascertain the semantic intentions of the 
constitution’s authors.  Partisan gerrymandering is not unconstitutional.  There is no “overbreadth” 
doctrine in American First Amendment jurisprudence, nor does the First Amendment protect against 
compelled speech.  There is no “state action” when state governmental officials violate state law.   
Analogical reasoning is not a genuine form of reasoning.  Mistakes of law are conceptually 
indistinguishable from mistakes of fact.  All rules are lies.  And this is just a very partial and almost 
random list. 
 I am persuaded by Alexander’s arguments for several of these arresting positions.  Others strike 
me as mistaken and one or two even a little wacky.  Be that as it may, his greatest talent, in my opinion, 
lies in his ability to frame problems in exceptionally clear and productive terms.   His particular genius, 
perhaps unmatched among today’s legal theorists, is to precisely identify, and to sharpen, the most 
formidable objections that a candidate view must meet.  When he does go awry, I think, it’s frequently 
due (when not chiefly attributable to his penchant for contrarianism) to a failure to anticipate possible 
avenues for meeting the challenges he has identified, causing him to conclude too quickly that p must 
be true on the ground that certain difficulties facing not p cannot be overcome.  But my key point is 
simply that, thanks to his uncanny nose for the vital issue or problem, Alexander’s work remains 
invaluable even on the occasions in which he ends up endorsing a dubious bottom line. Through his 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2268206
2 
 
published work and by means of remarkably generous and incisive comments on working drafts, 
Alexander consistently zeroes in on the pivotal challenge that allies and opponents alike must overcome. 
 In this essay, I hope to make a small return on the favor he has bestowed on the community of 
legal theorists by causing trouble for some of Alexander’s positions.  My central claim is this: Alexander 
is wrong to maintain that partisan gerrymandering does not violate the U.S. Constitution.  Stated in just 
this form, my thesis should appear oddly narrow. Of all that Alexander has written, the reader might 
wonder, why tackle this one, seemingly narrow, thesis?  My choice of target may seem a little like 
responding to an invitation to assess the second Bush presidency by critiquing a regulation on highway-
rail grade crossings promulgated by his Department of Transportation.  Though there may be more truth 
to the analogy than I wish to acknowledge, my hope is to draw from this single investigation some 
implications for Alexander’s views on other topics too—on the constitutional significance of 
governmental purposes, on the existence of legal principles, and on the force of originalism in 
constitutional interpretation.  
 
I. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of drawing legislative districts with an eye toward 
advancing the electoral prospects of a favored political party (or of retarding the electoral prospects of a 
disfavored party).  Although the term itself is fully two hundred years old and the practice much older 
still, scholars have long decried it as both unjust and unconstitutional.  Moreover, as recently as 2004, all 
nine Justices of the Supreme Court agreed that “excessive partisanship” in redistricting violates the U.S. 
Constitution, even while splintering over whether it is a constitutional wrong that the courts can 
effectively police.1 
Despite the breadth of the judgment that excessively partisan redistricting is unconstitutional, 
jurists have not reached agreement regarding just why that is, or what is the nature of the constitutional 
vice.  I find it useful to distinguish two broad possibilities: (1) that excessively partisan gerrymanders 
produce unconstitutional states of affairs or (2) that they are unconstitutional in virtue either of the sort 
of acts they are or of the reasons or purposes that animate them.  Either way, Alexander’s ultimate 
verdict (expressed here in an article coauthored with Sai Prakash) is that “Legislators do nothing 
constitutionally suspect when they draw districts with the hope of securing a partisan advantage.”2  
A. Alexander’s analysis 
The bulk of the Alexander and Prakash analysis focuses on several “claimed harms” that 
“*p+artisan gerrymanders supposedly cause."3   That is to say, it focuses on the first possibility identified 
above. The claimed harms are that such gerrymanders: “dilute” the value of votes cast by members of 
                                                          
1
 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
2
 Larry Alexander and Saikrishna B. Prakash, “Tempest in an Empty Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not 
Regulate Gerrymandering.” William & Mary Law Review, 50 (2008): 1-62, 7. 
3
 Id. at 14. 
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the disadvantaged political party; thwart the ability of a state’s electoral majority to effectively rule; 
produce uncompetitive general elections; produce legislative bodies that are excessively partisan and 
insufficiently prone to compromise; and (in violation of the First Amendment) impose burdens on 
citizens because of their political views. 
Alexander and Prakash find all of these objections spurious.  Their arguments, much simplified, 
are the same in each case—namely, that the baseline state of affairs against which partisan redistricting 
schemes produce departures are not states of affairs that the Constitution mandates.  For example, a 
state’s citizens are not constitutionally entitled to legislative delegations that mirror the state’s partisan 
divide, and the Constitution does not require competitive districts.  In short, “*e+ach of the very different 
objections voiced against gerrymandering—vote dilution, the non-competitiveness of elections, the 
polarization of legislatures—assumes that the Constitution establishes certain controversial districting 
and election ideals.  The fatal flaw running through all such complaints is that the Constitution neither 
envisions nor mandates any such ideals.”4 Put another way: “Because the Constitution does not 
enshrine some platonic form of districting plan, there is no constitutional standard against which 
districting plans can be measured and found lacking.”5 
 I believe that Alexander and Prakash are largely right about all of this.  Indeed, Alexander 
deserves plaudits for being among the first scholars, and possibly the very first, to criticize the vote 
dilution objection to partisan gerrymandering.6  But what about the non-consequentialist objections to 
partisan gerrymandering, those that maintain that it is constitutionally wrongful for redistricting 
authorities to pursue (or to excessively pursue) partisan goals even when the district lines they produce 
are not, by themselves, constitutionally objectionable? 
Alexander and Prakash seem to recognize, early in their article, that this is a different sort of 
objection.  As they put it:  “To many, gerrymandering . . . seems ethically unsavory, smacking vaguely of 
self-dealing. . . .  In drawing district lines, legislators are stacking the deck in their favor.”7  The “deck-
stacking” metaphor nicely captures the gist of the objection:  Even though there is no standard, supplied 
either by morality or by the rules or norms of the game, against which a (fairly) dealt poker hand “can be 
measured and found lacking,” we have no difficulty concluding that the dealer violates her obligations 
when purposely arranging the deck to produce this or that set of hands.   
Indeed, in many domains, outcomes that would be acceptable or entirely unproblematic if 
produced randomly or “innocently” are impermissible when achieved purposely.  To anticipate an 
observation Alexander and Prakash will make, consider the assignment, within a multi-judge district, of 
individual judges to hear a particular lawsuit or to sit on a particular panel.  This could be done randomly 
but needn’t.  I do not think that it would violate the Constitution were the chief judge to assign judges 
                                                          
4
 Id. at 8. 
5
 Id. at 9. 
6
 See Larry Alexander, “Lost in the Political Thicket.” University of Florida Law Review, 41 (1990): 563-80; Larry 
Alexander, “Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why I Don’t Understand the Concept of Vote Dilution).” Vanderbilt 
Law Review, 50 (1997): 327-38. 
7
 Alexander & Prakash, “Tempest,” 12. 
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by taking account of such considerations as the length of each judge’s backlog of opinions or their 
relative subject matter expertise. Yet it clearly would violate the Constitution were the chief judge to 
make assignments based on predictions regarding the side that particular judges would likely favor.  No 
litigant has a constitutional entitlement that Judge A will preside over her case or that Judge B will not.  
But the litigant does have a constitutional right that Judge A not be withheld from her case or that Judge 
B not be assigned to it because of predictions that the former would likely rule for her or that the latter 
would likely rule against her.  Analogizing to the uncontroversial judgments I have just expressed 
regarding the obligations of poker dealers and of chief judges cloaked with the power of assignment, we 
might reasonably surmise that citizens who (as Alexander and Prakash persuasively argue) are not 
constitutionally entitled to any particular districts or any particular political outcomes that districts 
might produce, are nonetheless constitutionally entitled to a redistricting process in which certain 
considerations are not acted upon. 
Stated differently, these other cases lend support to the belief that redistricters face a 
constitutional duty not to draw lines for the purpose of realizing partisan advantage, or not to draw lines 
for the purpose of realizing excessive partisan advantage.  This could be a deontological command or it 
could have an indirect consequentialist grounding.  Either way, the question that Alexander and Prakash 
must address is this: Why is reasoning broadly along such lines inadequate to support the widespread 
judgment that excessive partisanship in redistricting is unconstitutional? 
Acknowledging that “*t+he self-dealing objection to gerrymandering has the most appeal,”8 
Alexander and Prakash devote a page and half to articulating and then addressing it.  Their analysis is 
sufficiently important and sufficiently short that it is worth reproducing almost in full: 
[T]hose who press the self-dealing objection insist that it is unfair to let 
legislators draw district lines when they are likely to draw lines that further their 
personal or ideological interests.  Is that not analogous to allowing one litigant to pick 
the judge or panel of judges to hear his case?  Just as we require blind or randomized 
selection of judges and panels of judges . . . perhaps the Constitution likewise demands 
randomized districting. 
This objection perhaps has some validity as a matter of fair play.  But does it 
state a constitutional complaint?  If so, its implications go far beyond political and racial 
gerrymanders. . . .  The practical upshot of this objection . . . is to deem unconstitutional 
any districting scheme that is legislatively constructed with some of its electoral and 
policy outcomes relatively transparent. This objection would thus appear to mandate 
computer-generated districting schemes or their functional equivalents, using 
parameters that are totally or relatively opaque with respect to electoral and policy 
outcomes. 
[T]he self-dealing complaint also casts doubt on all manner of statutes.  
Legislation granting franking privileges, excluding legislators from the ambit of statutes, 
                                                          
8
 Id. at 57. 
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and increasing spending and cutting taxes in election years—all of these measures 
arguably stack the deck in favor of incumbents. . . .  
Ultimately, we take no stand on this objection or the various replies to it insofar 
as fairness and sound policy are concerned.  Our focus has been on whether partisan 
and other gerrymanders are constitutional wrongs in a world in which other, non-blind, 
non-randomized districting schemes are not.  Because from before the constitutional 
founding down to the present, district lines have been drawn by legislators conscious of 
demography, we seriously doubt the contention that anything in the Constitution 
mandates computerized or randomized districting.  Perhaps, however, the Supreme 
Court will instruct us otherwise.9 
B. Assessment 
The first thing to note about this analysis is that the very first sentence misdescribes the 
objection that it seeks to evaluate.  Understood in its more natural—and more forceful—form, the 
objection is (to a first pass) that it is unfair (or otherwise wrongful) for the legislature actually to draw 
lines with certain proscribed purposes, i.e., drawing lines for the purpose of furthering their electoral 
self-interest or the electoral interest of their party.  The objection is not that it is unfair (though it might 
well be unwise or imprudent) to create or maintain a system that facilitates or enables legislators to 
draw district lines with the proscribed purposes.  That is to say, Alexander and Prakash locate the 
claimed wrong at the wrong level.  The self-dealing objection maintains that legislators violate the 
Constitution when they do a certain complex act (draw the lines of electoral districts, enact a 
redistricting scheme, or the like) to achieve certain ends or motivated by certain reasons (partisan 
advantage).  The objection does not locate the constitutional violation in the possibility of legislators 
acting on this motive. 
This is not a quibble, for the body of Alexander and Prakash’s argument against “the self-dealing 
objection” all depends upon this misdescription.  The core of their argument—advanced, in slightly 
different language, no fewer than six times over a one-and-one-half-page discussion—is that the 
Constitution does not “mandate*+ computerized or randomized districting.” Fair enough.  But the self-
dealing objection as I have just described it neither maintains nor entails otherwise.  The self-dealing 
objection holds that, even insofar as redistricting authority is properly assigned to agents, including 
elected representatives, who are permitted to attend to a variety of considerations, there are some 
factors that the agents may not consider (or may not weigh too heavily) as reasons for or against this or 
that placement of a district line, and that one of the excluded factors concerns the partisan outcomes 
that the districting scheme would likely produce.  Compare:  it is wrongful for an instructor to assign 
higher or lower grades to student papers based in whole or in part on whether the paper defends a 
position with which the instructor agrees or on whether the paper cites work of the instructor; but it 
does not follow that any grading system that allows (in the sense of “makes possible,” not in the sense 
of “permits”) instructors to do so is impermissible or that papers must be computer-graded.  I suspect 
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that it is precisely their misdescription of the objection as one that attaches to the allowing of a 
wrongful possibility and not to the actualizing of it that leads Alexander and Prakash to the mistaken 
conclusion that the fact that redistricting by legislatures is constitutionally permissible (i.e., that the 
Constitution does not prohibit legislative redistricting tout court) rebuts the self-dealing objection. 
 Now, there is another possibility.  Reference in the passage’s second paragraph to the 
“implications” of the self-dealing objection, and to its “practical upshot,” suggest that Alexander and 
Prakash might be contending, not that the self-dealing objection itself maintains (or entails) that “the 
Constitution . . . demands randomized districting,” but that, as a practical matter, the only way that 
courts could effectively administer a constitutional command against excessive partisanship in 
redistricting decisionmaking is by adopting and enforcing a prophylactic rule that prohibits all 
redistricting by legislative bodies. 
But, for two reasons, this charitable reconstruction of Alexander and Prakash’s reasoning will 
not help them.  First, it is false that courts could craft no doctrinal tests, short of a blanket rule that state 
legislatures be barred from exercising any redistricting authority, that could adequately police the 
excessively partisan redistricting that the self-dealing objection, rightly understood, forbids.10  Second, 
even were my first response mistaken, and even were we to agree with Alexander and Prakash that a 
broad prophylactic rule categorically forbidding state legislatures from making redistricting decisions 
would be inappropriate, the correct lesson to draw would be that the constitutional vice that the self-
dealing objection identifies is nonjusticiable; the lesson would not be, as they contend, that partisan 
gerrymandering is constitutionally permissible.   
 So much for the core argument developed in the first, second, and fourth paragraphs quoted 
above.  The third paragraph advances a distinct argument, although, like the argument already 
discussed, it assumes the form of a reductio.  The first reductio was that a constitutional ban on 
excessive partisanship in redistricting entails the unacceptable conclusion that the Constitution requires 
random or computerized redistricting.  That claimed entailment, I have explained, is false.  The second 
reductio is that if a constitutional ban on excessive partisanship is grounded in “self-dealing” concerns, 
then other practices that should strike us, even on reflection, as constitutionally unobjectionable would 
also emerge as unconstitutional. 
This supposed entailment is no more persuasive than the first, but for different reasons.  Start 
by replacing the vague invocations of “the self-dealing objection” and the notion of deck-stacking with a 
more precise formulation of the rule or principle under consideration.  This will be contestable, but for 
reasons I have given elsewhere,11 the most plausible conception of the relevant constitutional principle 
holds (to a first approximation) that a legislature violates the Constitution if, in the pursuit of partisan 
advantage, it creates a districting plan that it expects to deliver a partisan return that is excessive 
relative to the partisan return that would be expected under the districting plan that the legislature 
would have enacted were it not motivated at all to realize partisan outcomes.  Two key points about this 
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 For a provisional exploration of some doctrinal possibilities, see Mitchell N. Berman, “Managing 
Gerrymandering.” Texas Law Review, 83 (2005): 781-854, 838-53. 
11
 Berman, “Managing Gerrymandering,” 809-28. 
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proposed principle warrant emphasis.  First, a legislature (or the political party that dominates it) is 
permitted to pursue some measure of partisan advantage, but not too much.12  Second, the baseline for 
evaluating magnitude of partisan advantage sought is counterfactual not normative: it is constituted by 
the electoral outcomes that would be expected under the scheme that the legislature would have 
adopted had partisan advantage not been among the considerations that shaped or informed its 
redistricting decisions.13 
With this candidate principle in hand, we can see immediately that it has literally nothing to say 
about the other practices that Alexander and Prakash mention.  This is a principle governing what we 
might fairly term “partisan greed” in redistricting or, somewhat more broadly, in the structuring of 
electoral rules and systems.  It is not a principle forbidding all manner of legislative actions that could 
reasonably be described as a form of self-dealing.  Alexander and Prakash might object that this 
narrower principle is unstable all by itself and is only sensible if understood as an instantiation or 
implication of a more general principle that does forbid all manner of legislative self-dealing.  But they 
would need an argument for that claim, and they provide none.14  Moreover, I am deeply skeptical that 
a persuasive argument is available to them.  Though I cannot pursue the issue further in this space, it 
seems to me that proponents of this narrower principle could rely upon any number of plausible 
distinctions to resist the broader principle—distinctions sounding in differences between, for example, 
partisan-advantage and incumbency-protection, constitutive or structural rules and regulatory rules, 
purposes attributable to the legislation and motives that individual legislators might have for voting for 
some particular legislation, and so on.  
 To summarize: Alexander and Prakash acknowledge that the self-dealing objection to partisan 
gerrymandering is the most promising one; they even confess to feeling some attraction to that view; 
but they end up rejecting it on grounds that are infirm.  In short, Alexander has not established that 
excessively partisan gerrymandering is not a constitutional wrong.  Admittedly, I have not established 
that it is.  Because the belief that excessive partisanship in redistricting is unconstitutional is so 
widespread, and because Alexander himself grants the pull of a rationale that sounds in a certain sort of 
corruption of the process (“self-dealing”) as opposed to one that rests on any supposed harms that 
partisan redistricting necessarily causes, I have contented myself by modestly bolstering the intuitive 
case for this claim and by showing that the reasons Alexander gives for resisting that pull do not 
persuade. 
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 I’ll have nothing to say here about how much is too much. 
13
 When criticizing the “vote dilution” rationale for the unconstitutionality of (excessively) partisan gerrymanders, 
Alexander observed that what we need, but don’t have, is “some normative principle to tell us when we have 
drawn district lines and produced the partisan mix of policies we should produce, and when we have drawn district 
lines and produced the wrong policies.”  Alexander, “Still Lost,” 328.  If the counterfactual baseline I have proposed 
is correct, then we would not need the sort of normative principle that Alexander rightly claims eludes us. 
14
 A possible argument might derive from Alexander’s rejection of legal principles that are not also moral 
principles.  (See Section II.B, below.)  The gist of the argument would be that the narrower putative principle is not 
a valid moral principle whereas the broader one is. As I will explain, I do not think his denial of legal principles is 
well taken. 
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II. BEYOND PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
I said earlier that I would draw from my critique of Alexander’s position on partisan 
gerrymandering some insights regarding other theses he has defended.  For want of space, this 
examination must remain only suggestive.  I do not claim that the criticisms I advance here are remotely 
sufficient to demonstrate that the other Alexanderian positions I discuss are incorrect.  My more modest 
goals are: first, to introduce a few of the bracing and heterodox claims for which Alexander is well 
known; and second, to provide some reasons to doubt them.  
A. Purpose skepticism 
The account I have offered of the unconstitutionality of excessively partisan gerrymanders is 
explicitly purpose-based.  Accordingly, the account fails if the constitutionality of given state action 
never depends upon the purposes that animate it.  And although I believe that Alexander does not deny 
the constitutional relevance of purposes in his pieces that squarely address partisan gerrymandering, he 
has elsewhere pressed just that concern.15  In a nutshell: “Effects, not governmental purposes, must be 
what ultimately matter.”16  Alexander’s skepticism that actions can ever be unconstitutional in virtue of 
the purposes on which the governmental actor acts thus provides additional grounds for his conclusion 
that partisan gerrymanders are constitutionally secure. 
Recall my earlier suggestion that a constitutional prohibition against excessive partisanship in 
redistricting could rest on either deontological or indirect consequentialist grounds.  Alexander clearly 
rejects the first possibility.  But what about the second?  Even if effects of governmental action are what 
ultimately matter, why couldn’t this ultimate concern crystallize into constitutional rules or principles 
that turn upon governmental purposes on the understanding or expectation that, at least in some 
contexts, a purpose-based rule would produce better state of affairs than would a purely effects-based 
rule?   
As it happens, Alexander considers just this possibility but refrains from endorsing it.  “The 
principal problem with this argument,” he contends, “is that it results in different treatment of identical 
laws in separate but otherwise similar jurisdictions.”17  I am unsure why this is any more of a problem 
(let alone a significantly greater one) than the fact that effects-based rules result in different treatment 
of identical laws that have been adopted for identical reasons in separate jurisdictions.  In any event, if 
this is the principal problem with constitutional rules and principles that turn on purposes, then 
Alexander has given us little reason to doubt that at least sometimes purpose-sensitive constitutional 
rules can be successfully defended on ultimate consequentialist grounds.  And while I cannot mount in 
this limited space a complete indirect consequentialist case for a purpose-sensitive constitutional rule 
against excessive partisanship in redistricting, it seems to me that the prospects for a successful defense 
                                                          
15
 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, “Constitutional Theory and Constitutionally Optional Benefits and Burdens.” 
Constitutional Commentary 11 (1994): 287-314; Larry Alexander, “Rules, Rights, Options, and Time.” Legal Theory 
6 (2000): 391-404. 
16
 Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression? (New York: Cambridge University Press 2005), 41.  
17
 Alexander, Freedom of Expression, 49.  (Alexander graciously attributes this argument to my “Coercion Without 
Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions.” Georgetown Law Journal 90 (2001): 1-112.) 
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along these lines are strong.  To offer a very modest down payment on that promissory note, here’s just 
a snippet of reasoning that might plausibly feature in such a case:  When an elected official knows with 
high confidence which of her constituents her political fortunes depend upon and which are politically 
irrelevant to her, she knows whom to listen to and whom she can safely ignore; in a severe partisan 
gerrymander, the representative does know this, as do her constituents, causing constituents from the 
opposition party to become politically disaffected and further dampening the civic republican instinct, 
already far from robust, that contributes to informed and effective collective self-governance.  
 B. Against legal principles 
 In the previous section, I spoke of “rules” and “principles” interchangeably.  But which is the 
(claimed) constitutional norm against excessive partisanship in redistricting—a rule or a principle?  That 
depends, of course, on just what distinguishes the two, and that’s a matter of some controversy.  Many 
commentators follow Dworkin in identifying two distinguishing features:  rules (including standards) are 
binary (or have infinite weight), whereas principles have variable weight; and rules have canonical form 
whereas principles do not.18  Another possibility is that rules and standards are the “obvious” law 
constituted, for example, by the communicative content of statutes and judicial holdings, whereas 
principles are the “unobvious” law that undergird, arises from, or justifies the obvious law.19  Whatever 
the best grounds of distinction may be, let us assume arguendo that the supposed constitutional norm 
against excessively partisan gerrymanders is a legal principle, not a legal rule.  If so, that would, for 
Alexander, be another mark against it because legal principles, he has argued, do not exist (or, at a 
minimum, should not be deployed in judicial decisionmaking). 
 Alexander’s argument for this surprising position is subtle and complex.  But here’s the crux, 
from an article co-authored with Ken Kress: 
Legal principles are either normatively unattractive or superfluous.  If legal principles 
dictate outcomes different from what moral principles and legal rules dictate, they are 
normatively unattractive.  If, on the other hand, they dictate the same outcomes that 
legal rules and moral principles dictate, they are normatively superfluous.  If normative 
unattractiveness or superfluity counts against the metaphysical existence of a norm, 
then the case we make against legal principles is a case against their existence.20 
This claim, if true, would not imperil the supposed constitutional principle against excessive partisanship 
in redistricting if that principle were, in addition to a legal principle, a moral principle too. But let us 
further suppose that it is not, that no true moral principle has just this content.  Instead, let us assume—
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 This is Alexander’s take.  See Larry Alexander and Ken Kress, “Against Legal Principles,” in Law and 
Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, ed. Andrei Marmor (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995): 279-327, 
281. 
19
 See Michael S. Moore, “Legal Principles Revisited.” Iowa Law Review 82 (1997): 867-91. 
20
 Alexander and Kress, “Against Legal Principles,” 303 n.96.  Predecessors to this presentation of the view include 
Larry Alexander and Michael Bayles, “Hercules or Proteus? The Many Theses of Ronald Dworkin.” Social Theory 
and Practice 5 (1980): 267-__; Larry Alexander, “Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in 
Dworkin’s Theory of Law.” Law and Philosophy 6 (1987): 419-38.  
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as Alexander himself is willing to entertain, though does not ultimately endorse—that true principles of 
political morality dictate that legislatures may pursue no partisan advantage when redistricting and 
even, more generally, that “fairness requires *a wholly+ outcome-blind process for drawing district 
lines.”21  These assumptions, when added to the Alexander and Kress position on legal principles, do 
provide further grounds—grounds not adduced in the pieces (discussed in Part I) that squarely concern 
gerrymandering—against the claim that excessively partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. 
 But is the Alexander and Kress skepticism of legal principles warranted?  I do not believe that it 
is.  The fly in the ointment, I think, attaches to their contention that “legal principles *that+ dictate 
outcomes different from what moral principles . . . dictate, . . . are normatively unattractive.”  
Normatively suboptimal I will concede; normatively unattractive, however, is too strong.  The putative 
legal principle we have been entertaining could be rendered as “some reliance on partisan advantage is 
permissible, but too much is not.”  The moral principle, we are supposing, holds that “legislatures may 
take no account of expected partisan outcomes when selecting redistricting plans.”    If the moral 
principle is not legally valid, then a legal regime that includes this putative legal principle is more 
attractive morally than one that does not.  In short: the norm could be a principle rather a rule, it could 
be legal rather than moral, and it could be a normatively attractive addition to a legal regime that lacks 
the moral principle. 
In saying all this, I believe that I am doing no more than reiterating an objection that Brian Leiter 
had made in reaction to a draft of the Alexander and Kress article.  Leiter’s suggestion, Alexander and 
Kress acknowledge in a footnote, was that “instead of characterizing legal principles as ‘incorrect’ moral 
principles, we should instead characterize them as ‘non-ideal’ moral principles.”22  Alexander and Kress 
do not take that advice, but nor do they explain why not.  I believe that they should have and that, were 
they to do so, their strong conclusion would not survive. 
 C. Originalism 
 Even if Alexander’s wholesale dismissal of legal principles is ill-founded, he has at least one 
remaining basis for rejecting the particular anti-excessive-partisan-gerrymandering principle that I have 
advocated: originalism.  In a host of articles,23 Alexander has defended a particular brand of 
constitutional originalism that is presently in disfavor.  Against all forms of non-originalism, and also 
against public meaning originalism, Alexander has maintained that constitutional interpretation is 
necessarily the activity of trying to discern the meaning that the Constitution’s authors intended to 
convey by means of the language they used.  Unless the intended meaning of any constitutional 
provision is or entails that excessive partisanship in redistricting is prohibited, then no such norm can be 
part of our constitutional law. 
                                                          
21
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 Alexander and Kress, “Against Legal Principles,” 288 n.44. 
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 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, “Originalism, or Who Is Fred?” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 19 (1995): 321-
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Interpretation, ed. Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 87-98. 
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 I have criticized originalism, in its intentionalist and non-intentionalist variants, elsewhere.24  I 
limit myself here to a single observation, albeit one with an admittedly ad hominem cast.  Many non-
originalists (and not only the doctrinaire Dworkinians amongst us) believe that the law consists of or 
includes principles that do not reflect the semantic meaning or the communicative content of any 
provision of the constitutional text or of any precise judicial holdings.25  Investigations into the 
coherence, intelligibility, and attractiveness of putative constitutional principles are just the sort of thing 
that such scholars would and do sensibly undertake.   And it is the sort of investigation that Alexander 
too engages in time and again—not only in his work on partisan gerrymandering on which I have 
focused, but also across a variety of topics that would seem to fall under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  The puzzle is why he should do so.  Why, as an originalist, does his case against, say, 
partisan gerrymandering, depend on anything other than the results of an historical inquiry into 
whether “no excessive partisan gerrymandering” was any part of the intended meaning of any clause of 
the Constitution?  Why doesn’t he think that explorations like his own are simply beside the point? 
 To be sure, Alexander might understand himself to be engaged in a wholly detached scholarly 
service.  That is, he might believe that the sort of inquiry he undertakes is entirely irrelevant to an 
understanding of what is a correct account of the content of our constitutional law, but might 
nonetheless proceed solely for the benefit of the benighted many who fail to appreciate its irrelevance.  
That is possible.  But that is not how his work reads to me.  It reads as the work of a constitutional 
scholar who believes that the constitutionality of extreme partisan gerrymanders depends at least in 
part on the results of investigations into what might be loosely described as parochial or domesticated 
political morality.  That is not a crazy belief.   Many or most non-originalists, I venture, would subscribe 
to it.  Insofar as Alexander does too, then perhaps he is a closet non-originalist.  If he refuses that 
compliment (as we can safely predict he will), then he might reflect on how best to explain what looks 
like a dash of scholarly schizophrenia.  In any event, readers of Alexander’s work on partisan 
gerrymandering who believe, on reflection, that it is a sensible and appropriate exploration for 
constitutional theorists to undertake (whether or not they are persuaded by the conclusion he reaches) 
might take that judgment as at least some defeasible evidence against the originalism he avows.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Bucking common academic and judicial wisdom, Larry Alexander has argued in a series of 
articles that partisan gerrymandering, even when extreme, does not violate the United States 
Constitution.  I have argued here that he is wrong about that.  The best argument for the orthodox 
position, I have claimed, sounds in impermissible “self-dealing,” or a corruption of the redistricting 
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legislature’s decisionmaking process.  The reasons that Alexander has given against this argument are 
not persuasive. 
But Alexander’s position on partisan gerrymandering, even if it stands on its own bottom, so to 
speak, does not stand alone.  It fits within a network of other views that Alexander has championed 
that, if not strictly necessary to generate his constitutional defense of extreme partisan gerrymanders, 
strengthen that heterodox position.  Those other views include doubt that governmental purposes can 
ever be constitutionally relevant, skepticism that legal principles that are not identical to moral 
principles exist, and insistence that (“mistaken” judicial precedents possibly aside) the proper 
determinants of our constitutional law are solely the semantic or communicative intentions of the 
Constitution’s authors.  I have provided some grounds, admittedly very incomplete and telegraphic, for 
rejecting each of these claims. 
Naturally, I would like to see Alexander abandon each of the positions that I have challenged 
here.  I do not, however, anticipate quite that outcome.  He is too clever and too creative (dare I add 
“also too obstinate”?)26 to quickly relinquish these several long-held views.  In the Alexanderian spirit, 
then, I would count this brief tribute a success if it identifies for him, as he has so often and so profitably 
identified for all who toil in any of his wide-ranging fields of legal theory, some worries that his 
provocative arguments still must meet. 
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 Yes, I do dare—though I also gird myself for the anticipated (and perhaps not wholly unjust) tu quoque.  
